Most of the crimes with which the higher courts of Victoria (the Supreme Court and the County Court) deal are known also as indictable offences. The majority have legal source in statutes of the Parliament of Victoria especially the Crimes Act, the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act and Occupational Health and Safety Act. Others are Commonwealth, that is have source in statutes of the Parliament of Australia, especially the Criminal Code and the Customs Act enacted under constitutional powers created by the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and, when alleged occurring in Victoria, vested in Victoria courts by The Judiciary Act. The capacity of the Parliament of Australia or of that of any State or Territory to make valid criminal or other laws is restricted by for instance the impermissibility of burdening the implied freedom of political communication provided by Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act: Brown v Tasmania  HCA 43.
Especially in the Magistrates' Court of Victoria there are many lesser crimes dealt with, known also as summary offences, which have legal source in Victoria statutes such as the Road Safety Act and the Summary Offences Act or in Commonwealth statutes. Likewise dealt with are summary offences having legal source in government regulations or local government area laws made under the authority of statute ("delegated legislation") with form resembling crimes but of minor nature with offenders not regarded as criminal, for example the Road Safety Road Rules, the Occupational Health and Safety Regulations or various local laws of for example the City of Melbourne or the City of Yarra: these sometimes are called quasi crimes. (Some less serious indictable offences can by consent be heard in the Magistrates' Court: Criminal Procedure Act ss.28-30).
The meaning of the Victoria statutory provisions is at points further provided by Interpretation of Legislation Act. In many instances the meaning has been explained by courts in reasons for deciding cases with those from the High Court of Australia and the Victoria Court of Appeal especially influential. There are various principles of statutory interpretation which sometimes assist. One is the presumption that in a statutory offence, guilty mind (mens rea) is an element, see further below. Another is that where the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation yield ambiguity or doubt, the resolution is to be by strict construction in favour of the subject: R v Roussety  VSCA 259, (2008) 24 VR 253. Another is "legality", an evolving principle of statutory interpretation preserving the scope of application of fundamental rights and freedoms: Brown v Tasmania  HCA 43; R v Lee  VSC 678 (sentencing provisions); Bagaric, Mirko; Alexander, Theo "Addressing the Curious Blackspot..."  MonashULawRw 19.
The Victoria Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 includes many provisions applicable to criminal law and process, also to penal institutions. Some of the matters it refers to are alternatively established by other statutes or common law. The raising of a Charter issue requires the notification, and the possible involvement, of additional entities including the Attorney-General. On effect of the Charter see Momcilovic v R  HCA 34, (2011) 245 CLR 1. For illustration of Charter relevance to penal institution arrangements, see Certain Children v Minister (No 2)  VSC 251 (found breaches of human right to humane treatment when deprived of liberty and child's human right to protection as in best interests); Minister v Certain Children  VSCA 343 (found decision-maker's failure to consider whether certain human rights not breached). For illustration of Charter potential relevance to criminal pre-trial process see Baker (a Pseudonym) v DPP  VSCA 58. See also Victim's Charter Act 2006.
For some crimes having source in legislation of the Parliament of Australia, jurisdiction instead has been legislated to the Federal Court of Australia, such as with crimes under the Competition and Consumer Act.
In some instances the alleged crimes dealt with in the higher courts of Victoria have legal source, at least partly, in the common law, that is in learning developed and maintained in the reasons for decision of the higher courts in so far as not superseded by legislation. There is also common law applicable to criminal process.
AustLII (Australian Legal Information Institute) is an immense free internet library containing Commonwealth and State laws and regulations, cases (reasons for decision) especially of the higher courts, and other legal materials.
> Defining a particular crime or quasi-crime
version 29 September 2017
All offences, whether crimes or quasi-crimes, are defined with fairly precise elements. Some elements concern a described act or omission and often a described consequence caused by that act or omission. Courts and writers on law call these "actus reus" elements. Many offences, especially more serious crimes, are defined in addition with guilty mind elements such as some intention, knowledge or recklessness. Courts and writers on law call these "mens rea" elements. There is as a matter of interpretation of uncertain statutory provisions, a presumption that mens rea is required: He Kaw Teh v R HCA 43, (1985) 157 CLR 523.
Though usually not made express, most offences as part of the actus reus require the act or omission to be conscious and deliberate (voluntary), that is to say not for example accident or under sane automatism, such as raised for consideration by the defence cases in Farquharson v R  VSCA 296, (2012) 36 VR 53 and MG v R  VSCA 97. (A claim of insane automatism raises a different issue, namely the limited defence of mental impairment, see below this page).
Where an offence as part of the actus reus has causation of consequence elements, occasionally, where there arguably are multiple possible causes, special attention is required. Ordinarily, significant or substantial cause is sufficient: Royall v R  HCA 27, (1991) 172 CLR 378; Robb v R  VSCA 125; Dunkley-Price v R  VSCA 310; R v Aidid VSCA 56; R v Withers VSCA 306; R v Lam VSCA 109, (2008) 185 A Crim R 453;R v Franklin  VSCA 79, (2001) 3 VR 9.
Intention where a required mens rea element ordinarily is general intent i.e. the intent to do the actus reus and, where the definition of the particular offence requires it, specific intent i.e. an intent to cause the consequence required by the definition. It is difficult to imagine facts where the distinction between voluntariness and general intent would be of practical importance. An accused cannot be regarded as having intended to do something unless it is established that he or she meant to do that thing: Smith v R  HCA 19. With offences defined to require harm to a person, the required mental element normally is to harm anyone: it is immaterial that the actual victim is a mistaken one (the "doctrine of transferred malice"; R v Pham  VSCA 57; R v Bacash  VicRp 86,  VR 92) or that there is no particular victim in view.
Strict liability and absolute liability offences have no mens rea elements: He Kaw Teh v R  HCA 43, (1985) 157 CLR 523. With strict liability offences there remains a defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact: CTM v R HCA 25, (2008) 82 ALJR 97;Proudman v Dayman HCA 28, (1941) 67 CLR 536; Kidd v Reeves VicRp 64,  VR 563. On this defence more generally, see R v Osip VSCA 237, (2000) 2 VR 595. With absolute liability offences there does not remain a defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact: Allen v United Carpet Mills Pty Ltd  VicRp 27,  VR 323; Wilson v Gahan VSC 72. There are some statutory offences, for example omissions under Occupational Health and Safety Act, which have a kind of qualified absolute liability.
Time and date ordinarily are not elements of an offence: R v RHMcl VSCA 61,  1 VR 746;R v Tieman  VicLawRp 2,  VLR 4.They can though be crucial to factual contest or for other reasons.
> Proving a crime or quasi-crime (1): evidence, specificity and particularity, burden of proof, standard of proof
version 13 September 2017
Attempted proof is by evidence comprised mainly of witness testimony or exhibits. Evidence is subject to many rules before it is admissible into a case, also to judicial discretions. Much of the Victoria evidence law is in Evidence Act and Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.
Specificity and particularity
Proof of an alleged crime against an accused must be proof of one specific instance of it; occasionally in this context problems of duplicity can arise: see below this page.
Particulars of a specific crime must be provided by prosecution: Criminal Procedure Act s.6(3), 159(3) and Schedule 1 Rules. A defendant is entitled to be told of the particular act, matter or thing alleged as the foundation of a charge; the rationale lies in the necessity of informing the court of the identity of the offence with which it is required to deal and in providing the accused with the substance of the charge which he or she is called upon to meet; the requirement is that a charge must at the least identify the essential factual ingredients of the offence: Kirk v IRC  HCA 1, (2010) 239 CLR 531. For trial, at least to considerable extent, particularisation is by means of a written prosecution opening which must be provided in advance and the prosecution if intending to depart substantially at trial from a matter set out in a document served and filed by that party must so inform the court and the other party in advance of the trial: Criminal Procedure Act ss.182, 184; R v Irvine  VSCA 239. For trial or summary hearing a defendant on request is entitled to whatever further particulars are reasonably required to make defence: R v ACR Roofing  VSCA 215, (2004) 11 VR 187; R v Australian Char VICSC 168,  3 VR 834. Whether prosecution is confined to further particulars is matter for judicial discretion: DPP Ref No 1 VicRp 71,  2 VR 405.
Burden of proof
Generally, the burden of proof of guilt is on prosecution, there being a presumption of innocence: Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act s.25(1); X7 v Australian Crime Commission  HCA 29, (2013) 248 CLR 92; Milkins v R  VSCA 93, sometimes, together with the standard of proof (below), called "the golden thread" following UK House of Lords case Woolmington v DPP  UKHL 1,  AC 462. This is to prove sufficient facts to make out against the accused each of the legal elements of the crime as defined. If the prosecution fails to satisfy the jury (or other tribunal of fact) of any legal element of an offence, then the prosecution fails and the result is verdict of not guilty (if jury) or dismissal. There is a famous representation from popular entertainment: youtube Rumpole - The Golden Thread (video).
In Woolmington, the reason given for the principle was its very long historical acceptance in England (a partial exception with some support was rejected as recent error). The deeper reason typically given is its safeguarding tendency against the wrongful finding of guilt and its consequences; it is the "jealous protection of liberty from which the golden thread is spun": Thompson v R HCA 30, (1989) 169 CLR 1 (per Brennan J).
Some statutory offences are defined with an extent of reversed legal burden of proof sometimes called reverse legal onus which requires the defence to prove some defensive part of the alleged offence if the defence is to succeed: Braysich v R  HCA 14, (2011) 243 CLR 434.
Some statutory offences are defined with an extent of reversed evidential burden of proof sometimes called reverse evidential onus which requires the defence to point to some evidence which justifies raising the defence as an issue: R v Khazaal  HCA 26, (2012) 246 CLR 601; R v DG VSCA 173.
Standard of proof
The standard of proof upon the prosecution is to prove the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Unless an enactment otherwise provides, the only matters that the trial judge may direct the jury must be proved beyond reasonable doubt are - (a) the elements of the offence charged or an alternative offence; and (b) the absence of any relevant defence: Jury Directions Act 2015 s.61. The trial judge may relate the evidence in the trial to directions under section 61 in many different ways: see Notes to s.61.
It is generally speaking unwise for a trial judge to attempt any explication of the concept of reasonable doubt beyond observing that the expression means what it says and that it is for the jury to decide whether they are left with a reasonable doubt (and in certain circumstances explaining that a reasonable doubt does not include fanciful possibilities) and contrasting the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt with the lower civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities: R v Dookheea  HCA 36. Jury Directions Act 2015 s.63 provides that without limiting any other power of a trial judge to give the jury an explanation of the phrase 'proof beyond reasonable doubt', a trial judge may give the jury an explanation of the phrase if the jury asks the trial judge (a) a direct question about the meaning of the phrase; or (b) a question that indirectly raises the meaning of the phrase. For how explanation may be given in response to jury question: s.64. The rule is embodied to confined extent by Evidence Act s.141 and s.8.
Where there are competing versions of events between prosecution and defence witnesses, it follows proof of guilt is not merely a choice between versions, and often it will be necessary to direct a jury on this point: Liberato v R HCA 66; (1985) 159 CLR 507; Raimondi v R  VSCA 194; AE v R  VSCA 168.
With reversed legal burden of proof, usually the standard is balance of probabilities.
> Proving a crime or quasi-crime (2): circumstantial evidence and inference, wilful blindness, presumption of regularity
version 25 October 2017
Circumstantial evidence and inference
One method of proof is from circumstances. The mental process from regard to circumstances to conclusion of guilt is known as inference.
When circumstantial proof is attempted, it follows from the need for proof beyond reasonable doubt that the inference of guilt is only to be drawn if all reasonable hypotheses (possible explanations) consistent with innocence are excluded: R v Baden-Clay  HCA 35, (2016) 258 CLR 308; Knight v R  HCA 56, (1992) 175 CLR 495; Peacock v R  HCA 66, (1911) 113 CLR 619. An inference to be reasonable must rest upon something more than mere conjecture; it must rest on more than groundless speculation: Barca v R  HCA 42; (1975) 133 CLR 82; R v Boyle  VSCA 289. On directions to jury: R v Rajakaruna (No 2)  VSCA 277, (2006) 15 VR 59.
Possession of information and accoutrements of trade which might have been used in the alleged offending may be relevant to circumstantial proof: Festa v R HCA 72, (2001) 208 CLR 593; Thompson and Wran v R HCA 21, (1968) 117 CLR 313; Joseph v R  VSCA 343; R v Dunmall VSCA 22;R v Edwards  VicSC 326, (1993) 67 A Crim R 439; R v Hofer VicSc 298, (1991) 55 A Crim R 225. Whether such evidence is relevant is facts-specific to the case: Falzon v R  VSCA 74.
Financial betterment or enrichment as inculpatory circumstance: Burns v R  HCA 21, (1975) 132 CLR 258; R v Rich VSCA 17, (2002) 4 VR 155. Expert opinion as to financial betterment: R v Ferguson  VSCA 198, (2009) 24 VR 531.
Wilful blindness occasionally is a relevant consideration as means of proving intention or knowledge: He Kaw Teh v R HCA 43, (1985) 157 CLR 523; R v Crabbe HCA 22,(1985) 156 CLR 464. This will be in very few cases: it must be very clear that it is an appropriate direction to give a jury in the circumstances of the trial: R v Garlick (No 2)  VSCA 23, (2007) 15 VR 388.
Presumption of regularity
Impagnatiello v Campbell VSCA 154. Acting in a public office is evidence of due appointment to that office, not only in civil proceedings, but also in a criminal case: Cassell v R  HCA 8, (2000) 201 CLR 189; Yamasa Seafood v Watkins VSC 156. It seems the presumption can fill gaps in proof but not of itself bestow a power though the "doctrine of the validity of the acts of de facto public officials" in some circumstances can do so: United Transport v Evans VicRp 14,  VR 240.
version 17 August 2017
On a contest, it is the defect of duplicity for a charge to allege more than one occurrence of an offence. The rule against duplicity rests on various considerations. Some are to do with the orderly administration of criminal justice: a court must know what charge it is entertaining in order to ensure that evidence is properly admitted, and in order to instruct the jury properly as to the law to be applied; in the event of conviction, a court must know the offence for which the defendant is to be punished; and the record must show of what offence a person has been acquitted or convicted in order for that person to avail himself or herself, if the need should arise, of a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict. The rule also rests upon a basic consideration of fairness, namely, that an accused should know what case he or she has to meet. See S v R  HCA 26, (1989) 168 CLR 266, especially per Gaudron and McHugh JJ. Another consideration is avoidance of the risk that individual jurors identify different occasions as constituting an offence so that there is no unanimity in verdict: S v R, per Dawson J.
The duplicity may be overt, that is to be seen from the words of the charge: Walsh v Tattersall  HCA 26, (1996) 188 CLR 77; Rixon v Thompson  VSCA 84, (2009) 22 VR 323; Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd VicRp 49,  VR 411. There is no overt duplicity where a charge relies on a definition establishing that a crime is able to be committed in alternative forms, for instance the provisions as interpreted in Hedberg v Woodhall HCA 2, (1913) 15 CLR 531 and R v Ginies VicRp 43,  VR 394. Whether with such an offence a jury must be directed of the need for unanimity on one form may lack universal answer: Wells v R (No 2)  VSCA 294 (yes for culpable driving); Zandipour v R  VSCA 179 (footnotes some uncertainty whether for handling stolen goods). In determining whether a statutory provision creates a single offence in the alternative, or separate offences, it is a guide towards the latter if separate penalties are provided: R v His Honour Judge Hassett  VicSC 765, (1994) 76 A Crim R 1. There is no overt duplicity where the facts for an essential ingredient of a crime are particularised on the charge in multiplicity, but a jury must be directed of the need for unanimity on one proof: Magnus v R VSCA 163; R v Walsh VSCA 98.
The duplicity may be latent, that is, seen only by reference to the alleged facts; sometimes the terminology is "concealed" instead of "latent". It occurs where alleged facts supporting the charge have more than one specific occurrence of the offence alleged in the count: S v R  HCA 66, (1989) 168 CLR 266; Johnson v Miller HCA 77, (1937) 59 CLR 467; R v Rigoli  VSCA 1; R v Suckling VSCA 60; R v Trotter VicSC 160, (1982) 7 A Crim R 8. Sometimes it is called the defect of uncertainty. It is not latent duplicity to allege as a single offence activity comprised of multiple acts being part of a single transaction e.g. the violent activity in Zandipour v R  VSCA 179, R v Heaney  VSCA 74, (2009) 22 VR 164, and R v Goldman VSCA 25, or the sexual activity in PDI v R VSCA 446 and R v Yankovski  VSCA 259, (2007) 17 VR 315. It is not latent duplicity to allege a single offence where the offence definition extends to continuing offending being acts on separate occasions e.g. the drug trafficking provisions in R v McCulloch VSCA 34, (2009) 21 VR 340; R v Komljenovic  VSCA 136 and R v Giretti VicSC 484, (1986) 24 A Crim R 112. There is no latent duplicity where the proof of an essential ingredient of the crime charged is put on alternative facts, but a jury must be directed of the need for unanimity on one proof: R v Klamo  VSCA 75, (2008) 18 VR 644; .
Duplicity at trial is overcome if the prosecution makes an election: Johnson v Miller HCA 77, (1937) 59 CLR 467; Rixon v Thompson  VSCA 84. This requires identifying the specific alleged occurrence of the offence which is relied upon. With latent duplicity, the election must identify the occasion, transaction or occurrence to which the charge refers and distinguish it from other like occasions, transactions or occurrences indifferently answering the description contained in the complaint: Johnson v Miller per Dixon J; DPP v Judge Lewis  1 VR 39 (tie the evidence to one of the instances and make it incapable of equal application to each of the other instances). The technique of nominating a "first occasion" will overcome the difficulties identified in S v R provided that it would not prevent fair trial and there is some way that the specific act that constitutes the offence alleged in the charge can be identified and distinguished from all other similar conduct; if the existence of the first occasion within the dates specified is notional rather than evidence based, then the prosecution will have failed to distinguish between the act it set out to prove and the uncharged acts of the same nature and latent duplicity will not have been avoided; this does not mean that some distinguishing feature is required additional to evidence that establishes that the act constituting the offence charged was the first occasion on which such conduct occurred: JRW v R  VSCA 255; Veysey v R VSCA 309; TC v R VSCA 190; PPP v R  VSCA 110; R v Osborne  VSCA 88; R v DWB  VSCA 223, (2008) 20 VR 112.
The remedy for refusal or failure to elect a specific offence depends on the circumstances. It may include stay of charge for abuse of process, quashing of count, exclusion of evidence, directed acquittal, discharge of jury or on appeal, quashing of conviction. Where there is latent ambiguity, entitlement to remedy requires showing also some real prejudice or unfairness to the accused: PPP v R  VSCA 110; R v NVD  VSCA 230, (2007) 177 A Crim R 108.
"Duplicity" is sometimes used in another sense namely when a charge has another charge duplicating it. In R v Warburton  VSC 446, an issue arose in advance of jury trial whether counts were "duplicitous" in this sense (and held on review not so). Issues of this kind at trial really are ones of forestalling or dealing with double jeopardy, or on appeal, of unsafeness.
version 31 October 2017
Identification evidence by Evidence Act Dictionary means evidence that is - (a) an assertion by a person to the effect that an accused was, or resembles (visually, aurally or otherwise) a person who was, present at or near a place where - (i) the offence for which the accused is being prosecuted was committed; or (ii) an act connected to that offence was done - at or about the time at which the offence was committed or the act was done, being an assertion that is based wholly or partly on what the person making the assertion saw, heard or otherwise perceived at that place and time; or (b) a report (whether oral or in writing) of such an assertion.
Visual identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible unless - (a) an identification parade that included the defendant was held before the identification was made; or (b) it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade; or (c) the defendant refused to take part in such a parade - and the identification was made without the person who made it having been intentionally influenced to identify the defendant: Evidence Act s.114. In s.114, visual identification evidence means identification evidence relating to an identification based wholly or partly on what a person saw but does not include picture identification evidence. The section elucidates the matters that may be taken into account by the court in determining whether it was reasonable to hold an identification parade in determining whether it was reasonable to hold an identification parade. For s.114 to apply it is necessary that the person testifying as to the description asserts some resemblance between the person described and the accused: DPP v Bass (a Pseudonym)  VSCA 110.
There is no compulsion that an accused participate in an identification parade, but refusal is usually to go to jury, being explanation for lack of parade: R v Davies  VSCA 90, (2005) 11 VR 314.
Picture identification evidence is in certain defined circumstances inadmissible: Evidence Act s.115.
Aural (voice) identification and identification of objects e.g. guns: Tran v R  VSCA 79; R v Ong VSCA 206, (2007) 176 A Crim R 366; R v Callaghan VSCA 209,  4 VR 79; aural R v Harris No 3  VicRp 28,  VR 310; R v Hentschel  VicRp 46, VR 362.
Identification evidence is subject also to possible exclusion by operation of the prejudice rule: see notes5; Evidence Act s.137; R v Dickman  HCA 24 (on facts rule arising for consideration but exclusion an error); Bayley v R  VSCA 160 (exclusions required, the examples being long delayed identification from single Facebook image of person since notorious followed by photoboard selection). Courts in this context, including in Bayley, have often referred to unfair prejudice arising from ‘displacement effect’ or ‘unconscious transference’.
There is a distinction between recognition evidence and identification evidence: R v Defrutos VSCA 55; R v Spero  VSCA 58, (2006) 13 VR 225
A person involved in commission of offence is taken to have committed the offence; a person is not taken to have committed an offence if the person withdraws from the offence: Crimes Act s.324. A person is involved in the commission of an offence if the person (a) intentionally assists, encourages or directs the commission of the offence; or (b) intentionally assists, encourages or directs the commission of another offence where the person was aware that it was probable that the offence charged would be committed in the course of carrying out the other offence; or (c) enters into an agreement, arrangement or understanding with another person to commit the offence; or (d) enters into an agreement, arrangement or understanding with another person to commit another offence where the person was aware that it was probable that the offence charged would be committed in the course of carrying out the other offence: Crimes Act s.323. There is a Supreme Court trial ruling that para (c) does not require presence as an extra element of but does so require "participation": R v Semaan (Trial Ruling 7)  VSC 170. On withdrawal from the offence, a Note to s.324 refers to common law, for example White v Ridley HCA 38; (1978) 140 CLR 342; R v Tietie, Tulele and Bolamatu (1988) 34 A Crim R 438; R v Jensen and Ward VicRp 24;  VR 194. Other offenders need not be prosecuted or found guilty: Crimes Act s.324A. Offenders role need not be determined: Crimes Act s.324B. Persons joined in commission of an offence by operation of s.324 are sometimes said to be involved in a joint criminal enterprise adopting terminology of abolished common law: Crimes Act s.324C.
An accessory is a person who, where a principal offender has committed a serious indictable offence, knowing or believing the principal offender to be guilty of the principal offence or some other serious indictable offence, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse does any act with the purpose of impeding the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of the principal offender: Crimes Act s.325; R v Saad  VSCA 249, (2005) 156 A Crim R 533. A principal offender and an accessory are viewed by s.325 as committing separate offences. There is an exception mainly concerning married person and spouse: Crimes Act s.328.
In some circumstances a, crime can be committed on the basis of action through the agency of another: White v Ridley HCA 38, (1978) 140 CLR 342; Pinkstone v R  HCA 23, (2004) 219 CLR 444; R v Franklin VSCA 79, (2001) 3 VR 9. For federal offences, Criminal Code s.11.3.
> Criminal defence
version 18 October 2017
It follows from the general principles of proof outlined above that defence of criminal allegation typically involves propounding that one or more of the legal elements of the alleged crime is not proved beyond reasonable doubt against the accused. The crucial preliminary step is to find and study the precise legal elements of the crime charged. Often defence of criminal allegation also involves propounding that one of the legal elements of the alleged crime is false in fact, but logically it is not necessary to go to this extent. With an element where the attempted proof is by circumstantial evidence, defence of criminal allegation typically involves propounding that there is at least one reasonable infererence (or "hypothesis") consistent with innocence. Often this also involves propounding an actual explanation of innocence, but logically it is not necessary to go to this extent.
It is a defence that the identification of the accused as the person who apparently committed a crime is not proved beyond reasonable doubt against the accused. Often defence of criminal allegation also involves propounding that the accused was not the person who apparently committed a crime, but logically it is not necessary to go to this extent.
In a case of alleged complicity in crime, it is defence that the element of complicity is not proved beyond reasonable doubt against the accused. Often defence of criminal allegation also involves propounding that the accused was not complicit in a crime, but logically it is not necessary to go to this extent.
There is a defence of reasonable self-defence, requiring disproof by the prosecution: Crimes Act s.322K. The circumstances in which a person may carry out conduct in reasonable self-defence include the defence of the person or another person; the prevention or termination of the unlawful deprivation of the liberty of the person or another person; and the protection of property: Notes to s.322K. The defence does not apply to a response to lawful conduct: s.322L. Part of the definition of self-defence is that the person carrying out the conduct believes it is necessary in self-defence. A further part of the definition is that the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as the person perceives them. In the case of murder, by s.322K the belief must be that the threat is to inflict death or really serious injury.
There is a defence of duress, requiring disproof by the prosecution: Crimes Act s.322O. Part of the definition of the defence of duress is that the person reasonably believes that (i) a threat of harm has been made that will be carried out unless an offence is committed; and (ii) carrying out the conduct is the only reasonable way that the threatened harm can be avoided. By Parker (a Pseudonym) v R  VSCA 101, (though primarily concerned with an earlier duress provision) the reasonableness of the belief refers to a reasonable person possessing the personal characteristics of the accused that might have affected the accused’s appreciation of the circumstances. A further part of the definition is that the conduct is a reasonable response to the threat. By Parker this reasonableness refers to the circumstances as a reasonable person, possessing the personal characteristics of the accused, would have perceived them to be. By s.322O, in the case of murder the belief must be that the threat is to inflict death or really serious injury.
With the defences of reasonable self-defence and duress there are provisions concerning family violence. As to evidence of family violence and its relevance to belief and reasonableness: Crimes Act s.322J, s.322M and s.322P. As to jury directions in such cases: Jury Directions Act 2015 ss.55-60.
There is a defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency, requiring disproof by the prosecution: Crimes Act s.322R; Loung v DPP (Cth)  VSCA 296 (on a similar defence to Commonwealth offences by Criminal Code 10.3); Stevens v R  HCA 65, (2005) 227 CLR 319 on a similar defence under Queensland law).
See further as to considerations of belief and reasonableness, and in the context significance of intoxication: Crimes Act s.322T.
There is a defence of reasonable crime prevention or arrest, requiring disproof by the prosecution. It applies to using such force not disproportionate to the objective as believed on reasonable grounds to be necessary to prevent the commission, continuance or completion of an indictable offence or to effect or assist in effecting the lawful arrest of a person committing or suspected of committing any offence: Crimes Act s.462A; obliquely mentioned in R v Smith  VicRp 2, (1995) 1 VR 310.
Except for treason or murder, there is for a woman a defence of marital coercion, requiring disproof by the prosecution: Crimes Act s.336; R v G.J. Williams Court of Appeal (Vic) 16 October 1997.
With crimes against the person, consent is a common law defence in some circumstances which the law has guarded carefully, including proper medical, sporting and exhibition, also sado-masochistic sexual activity short of infliction of significant physical injury, and requiring prosecution proof of lack of consent: Reeves v R  HCA 57, (2013) 88 ALJR 215; R v Stein  VSCA 300 (being manslaughter case, went to issue of unlawfulness); Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 1)  VicRp 29,  VR 331 (civil case also referring to crime). The sexual crimes against the person which have lack of consent as an element have their own definitional provisions.
Diplomatic immunity may be conceptually distinct but is for practical purposes like a defence. It is rare for any such claims to reach the higher criminal courts though e.g. unsuccessful claims in Von Arnim  HCATrans 160 (mentions County Court presentment); Von Arnim  FCA 1747 (re extradition). The immunities and privileges for diplomatic agents and family members stated by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations are made Australian law by Commonwealth law Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act. They are set out in the Schedule to the Act and include, subject to waiver, such as these. Article 29: The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity…Article 31: 1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State...Article 41: 1. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State... For high officers and missions of certain international organizations seeInternational Organizations (Privileges and Immunities) Act.
Intoxication is not a legal defence. However, the fact that an accused was or might have been intoxicated ordinarily is relevant to whether elements of mens rea and voluntariness are proved: R v O'Connor HCA 17, (1980) 146 CLR 64; R v TC VSCA 282; R v McCullagh  VSCA 163; R v Faure  VSCA 166,  2 VR 537. For federal offences, Criminal Code s.8.1.
On duties of criminal defence counsel (and prosecutor) to request Judge that particular directions to jury be given or not given: Jury Directions Act 2015 s.12.
> Unfitness to be tried and mental impairment
version 1 June 2017
Unfitness to be tried
An issue which can arise is whether an accused at time for trial or plea of guilty hearing is unfit to be tried: Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act; SM v R  VSCA 332; R v NCT  VSCA 240, (2009) 26 VR 247; R v Langley  VSCA 81. There is trial before jury solely as to the issue of fitness to be tried ("to stand trial"). The party raising the issue has the onus of proof which is to be on balance of probabilities: s.7.
Section 6 provides: (1) A person is unfit to stand trial for an offences if, because the person's mental processes are disordered or impaired, the person is or, at some time during the trial, will be - (a) unable to understand the nature of the charge; or (b) unable to enter a plea to the charge and to exercise the right to challenge jurors or the jury; or (c) unable to understand the nature of the trial (namely that it is an inquiry as to whether the person committed the offence); or (d) unable to follow the course of the trial; or (e) unable to understand the substantial effect of any evidence that may be given in support of the prosecution; or (f) unable to give instructions to his or her legal practitioner. (2) A person is not unfit to stand trial only because he or she is suffering from memory loss.
In the event of verdict of fit to be tried, the case proceeds as normally, before fresh jury if there is still contest.
A verdict of unfit to be tried is no sense a finding of defence. It gives the judge powers depending upon the circumstances either to postpone trial of the allegations or proceed to special hearing of them which must be before a fresh jury and include determination of any mental impairment defence: SM v R  VSCA 342. A judge has power to vacate an order that there be an investigation of fitness to stand trial if circumstances change before a jury is empanelled: R v Demicoli  VSCA 69.
Another issue which can arise is whether a person at the time of committing what otherwise would be an offence was mentally impaired as defined by Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act s.20. If so, the person can take the defence of not guilty because of mental impairment. This is quite different from an ordinary verdict of not guilty. It is instead a limited defence and if found a supervision order may be made often involving major confinement: ss.23-38F.
The definition is that at the time of engaging in conduct constituting the offence the person was suffering from a mental impairment that had the effect that (a) he or she did not know the nature and quality of the conduct; or (b) he or she did not know that the conduct was wrong (that is, he or she could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether the conduct, as perceived by reasonable people, was wrong). The terms of s 20 incorporate the common law test of criminal insanity as it has developed in Australia, including confinement of the defence to conditions being a disease or defect or disorder of the mind: Kosian v R  VSCA 357 (form of psychotic illness); see also R v Fitchett  VSCA 150 (form of psychotic illness). A simple drug-induced psychosis is not such a condition:R v Sebalj VSCA 106; R v Konidaris VSC 89.
Para (a) means the state of mind is that in which the accused is prevented by mental impairment from knowing the physical nature of the act the accused is doing: Kosian.
There is, without empanelment of jury, judicial power upon trial but not upon special hearing to direct a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental impairment where the prosecution and the defence agree that the proposed evidence establishes the defence: s.21(4); SM v R  VSCA 342. Otherwise the issue is to be determined by a jury on the balance of probabilities with burden of proof on the accused: s.21(2).
For mental impairment, the Act extends to summary hearings at the Magistrates' Court.
Historically the common law limited defence of criminal insanity previously existing in Victoria was related to that which had old origin from England known as the M'Naghten Rules: M'Naghten's Case  UKHL J16; (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200 (8 ER 718).
There is at common law a rebuttable presumption referred to as doli incapax that a child aged at least 10 but less than 14 is incapable of committing a criminal act. The presumption is rebutted if the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt the child knew the act or acts were seriously wrong; the presumption cannot be rebutted merely as an inference from the doing of that act or those acts: RP v R  HCA 53.
A child without responsibility may be innocent agent of a person with responsibility, criminal liability thereby attaching to the latter by the principle of innocent agency, see above this webpage.
For children, the Children's Court of Victoria with a few exceptions has jurisdiction to hear and determine charges against young people. For alleged breach of Victoria law, Children, Youth and Families Act defines young people as aged above 10 years and less than 18 years at the time of committing the alleged offence, and less than 19 years when a proceeding for the offence is commenced in the Court. See also Sentencing notes.
this page is www.justd.notes1.htm
page author Don Just barrister of Victorian Bar Melbourne, Victoria, Australia